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Abstract We study the impact of endogenous shocks driven by collective actions
of managers. We analyze how such endogenous shocks impact social welfare by
employing an overlapping-generations model. We first prove that the competitive
equilibrium allocation is suboptimal because of the externalities in managers’ wages
and in equity market. We establish that a socially optimal allocation can be achieved
if the planner imposes wage taxes (or subsidies) on managers and equity taxes. Our
results help provide an alternative explanation as to why managers are compensated
and taxed differently than other workers. We then extend the model by incorporating
unobservable actions for managers and show that a second-best allocation can be
implemented if the planner imposes equity taxes.
Keywords Endogenous uncertainty · Social welfare · Externality · Overlapping
generations
JEL Classification D51 · D61 · D62
1 Introduction
Economists have always been of two minds when it comes to modeling uncertainty. The
earliest approach, which is called the “state-of-nature” (or Savage) approach, models
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the probabilities of possible outcomes as fixed and independent of agents’ actions. In
the traditional models, it is reasonable to assume that output shocks are exogenous and
independent of agents’ actions as agents take the states of the world given. However,
the state-of-nature approach may be inadequate when a model considers settings in
which agents’ actions intrinsically affect the state of the economy and hence the well-
being or distress of firms and households in the economy.
A good recent example of how agents’ actions affects the state of the economy is
how the seizing up of the mortgage-backed securities market ended up freezing the
world financial markets in 2008. In principle, bundling mortgages from different areas
and different income profiles made a perfect sense as a way of diversifying the risk
of a borrower defaulting on the mortgage. Packaging these up as securities to sell
to large numbers of investors also further diversified the default risk. One drawback
of the process, however, was the decoupling of loan origination from risk bearing.
In a number of un- or under-regulated real estate markets, far too many so-called
“sub-prime loans” were made to borrowers who clearly could not afford to carry the
mortgage. This also generated an increase in housing values, which led a number of
homeowners to increase consumption. When the inevitable defaults started and the
housing price bubble deflated, credit markets ended up in panic, because no one knew
what the various mortgage-backed securities were actually worth. Securitization of
loans indeed reduced an individual bank’s risk exposure, but the collective actions
of all banks (or bank managers) engaging in securitization resulted in a spectacular
failure.
Motivated by examples like the 2008 crisis, we study how endogenous shocks
driven by collective actions of managers impact social welfare. In particular, we ask
the following research questions: (Q1) do markets deliver a socially optimal allocation
in the presence of endogenous shocks? (Q2) if not, how can the social planner imple-
ment a socially optimal allocation? Because managers’ actions may be unobservable,
we examine how endogenous shocks impact social welfare under information asym-
metry. Specifically, we ask: (Q3) how can the social planner implement a second-best
allocation?
To address these questions, we construct an overlapping-generations model with
two-period-lived agents in which young agents serve as line workers/lower level
employees, whereas old agents serve as managers. This is because we observe a
natural division of labor across the age spectrum. For most established companies,
top-tier managers are middle aged or older. For example, 87% of S&P 100 companies
have CEOs older than 50 years, and for S&P 500 companies, median age of CEOs is
56, and average age of CEOs is 55 (cf. Spencer Stuart). This is because management
activities are qualitatively different from even the most technically demanding pro-
duction activities that firm engage in. Managers fundamentally work to maximize the
probability of favorable outcomes (e.g., innovating new products) and minimize the
probability of adverse outcomes (improving quality and safety of current products) in
their firms’ production activities. This task necessitates a degree of comprehension of
the overall structure and function of the firm that even very well-educated line work-
ers typically do not have. Obtaining this knowledge requires a combination of early
on-the-job training at entry level activities, typically followed by the attainment of an
advanced degree (generally an MBA), and then another stint on the managerial career
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ladder learning the idiosyncrasies of the firm’s overall performance. Because this all
takes time to accomplish, we see a natural division of labor across the age spectrum:
young agents serve as line workers/lower level employees, while old agents serve as
risk managers. In return for their service, young and old agents earn wages. Moreover,
agents hold ownership shares of firms, i.e., equities.
Before answering the research questions (Q1)–(Q3) listed above, we first prove the
existence of a competitive equilibrium allocation (Proposition 1). We then prove that
competitive equilibrium allocation is suboptimal in the presence of endogenous shocks
driven by collective actions of managers (Proposition 2). The source of inefficiency
is the externalities in managers’ wages and in equity market. These externalities must
be internalized to restore efficiency. We establish that to attain a socially optimal
allocation, the social planner must impose wage taxes (or subsidies) on managers
and equity taxes (Theorem 1). Our results provide an alternative explanation as to
why managers are compensated and taxed differently than other workers. We then
extend the model by incorporating unobservable actions for managers and show that a
second-best allocation can be implemented if the social planner imposes equity taxes
(Proposition 3).
Related literature
This paper is broadly related to three streams of the literature: the overlapping gener-
ations, managerial compensation, and managerial taxation literature.
The overlapping-generations literature has long been concerned about the optimal-
ity of competitive equilibrium under different settings. For example, Cass (1972) and
Gale (1973) provide ways to determine whether competitive equilibrium is Pareto
optimal. Peled (1982) and Chattopadhyay and Gottardi (1999) prove the optimality
of competitive equilibrium in a pure-exchange economy, where agents live two peri-
ods. Demange (2002) gives a comprehensive characterization of different optimality
notions for competitive equilibrium. We contribute to this literature by incorporating
endogenous shocks and characterizing the equilibrium under endogenous shocks.
Other streams of related literature are managerial compensation and taxation lit-
erature. Since Jensen and Meckling (1976), the managerial compensation literature
focuses on the agency problem—in particular, managers do not necessarily act in the
best interest of shareholders, so shareholders offer contracts to incentivize managers to
maximize shareholder value (see Murphy 1999 for a comprehensive survey). The man-
agerial taxation literature usually assumes that managers’ effort is private information,
so the social planner pays informational rent to managers to extract that information
(see Mankiw et al. 2009; Diamond and Saez 2011 for surveys).1 Both managerial com-
pensation and taxation literature derive impactful results and provide useful insights
by considering information asymmetries. We contribute to these streams of the liter-
ature by identifying an alternative reason why managers are compensated and taxed
differently than other workers using a model without information asymmetries.
1 In a recent study, Ales et al. (2017) assume that managers’ talent is private information, and calculate
optimal taxes for managers.
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The closest study to this paper is a recent paper by Magill et al. (2015). Magill
et al. (2015) show that firms must act in the best interest of all stakeholders, i.e.,
firms’ consumers, workers, and shareholders instead of only shareholders. This is
because the firm faces endogenous shocks influenced by its investments, and these
shocks create externalities on consumers and workers of the firm. Because of these
externalities, the competitive equilibrium is suboptimal. The competitive equilibrium
becomes Pareto optimal, however, if the firm adopts the stakeholder criterion, which
takes into account shareholders as well as consumers and workers. In the present paper,
shareholders of firms are also consumers and workers of firms, and yet, the competitive
equilibrium is suboptimal, because endogenous shocks driven by collective actions
of managers create externalities in managers’ wages and in the equity market. While
Magill et al. (2015) consider a simple economy with a single firm, we consider a
general economy with many firms competing on the product and labor markets. While
Magill et al. (2015) argue that taxes cannot be used to internalize the externalities,
because the firm’s investments are unobservable, we show that if managers’ actions
are unobservable, equity taxes can internalize the externalities in the equity market,
and hence, imposition of equity taxes makes Pareto improvements.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we elaborate on
model ingredients and define competitive equilibrium. In Sect. 3, we analyze the
existence and optimality of competitive equilibrium, managers’ wages, and taxes, and
extend the model by incorporating information asymmetry. In Sect. 4, we conclude
with a brief discussion. We present all proofs in Appendix.
2 Model
Consider an infinite-time horizon, stochastic overlapping-generations model in which
agents become economically active at the age of 20 and live for two periods, each of
which spans 30 years. Agents become young in the first periods of their lives and old
in the second periods. At each period, new young agents are born, and young agents
of the previous period become old agents. There is a continuum of identical agents
and a continuum of identical firms, so the impact of each agent (he) or each firm (it)
on prices is negligible.
Agents. To reflect the natural life-cycle division of labor, young agents provide
unskilled labor ay , whereas old agents provide skilled labor ao. By the same rea-
soning, while young agents serve as line workers, old agents serve as risk managers.
Throughout this paper, we shall use “old agents” and “managers” interchangeably.
We focus on managers’ risk management activities, and normalize the management
of other activities to zero to isolate the impact of risk management activities. Young
agents earn unit wages wy , and old agents earn unit wages wo in exchange for their
labor inputs. Young agents supply their labor inelastically. Old agents choose their
labor supply by taking into account disutility from labor, and their disutility function
φ : R+ → R+ is increasing and strictly convex in their labor inputs ao. We shall use
“labor inputs” and “actions” interchangeably throughout this paper.
Agents hold ownership shares of firms, i.e., equities. Equity e is a productive asset,
and the supply of equity is fixed and normalized to one. Old agents initially possess
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equities,2 but they sell these equities to young agents at a price p. At each period,
equity holders earn a dividend δ, which takes on high (H ) or low (L) value, i.e.,
δ ∈ {δH , δL}, where δH > δL . Agents’ preferences are given by a utility function
U = u(cy) + E[u(co) − φ(ao)], where cy and co are consumptions when young and
old, respectively; u : R+ → R is twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing
and strictly concave in c, and satisfy Inada conditions. Agents face budget constraint
cy ≤ aywy − pe when they are young and co ≤ aowo + (p + δ)e when they are old
wherein the consumption good is numeraire, so its price is normalized to one.
Firms. Firms produce the consumption good using agents’ labor inputs and in return,
pay wages to agents. Firms engage in production processes determined by two fac-
tors: a deterministic and a stochastic component. The deterministic component is
represented by a production function f : R+ → R+ which uses young agent’s labor
input ay , and is increasing and concave in ay . The stochastic component is repre-
sented by an individual output shock z, which takes on high (H ) or low (L) value, i.e.,
z ∈ {zH , zL}, where zH > zL . The addition of the stochastic and the deterministic
components is equal to the total output γ , i.e., γ = z + f (ay). The total output γ and
production f (ay) are observable, so the output shock z is also observable. Each firm
maximizes its profit P = E[γ ] − aywy − aowo in which the consumption good is
numeraire, and hence, its price is normalized to one.
As we discuss in ”Introduction”, managers’ actions may affect aggregate shocks.
The most precise way of modeling it would be that each manager’s actions drive his
own firm’s idiosyncratic shocks, and these idiosyncratic shocks produce aggregate
shocks. However, such a model would create infinitely many types of firms under
infinite-time horizon and hence would be intractable. To keep the model tractable, we
assume that individual output shocks are (perfectly) correlated across firms, which in
turn generate aggregate shocks. These aggregate shocks are driven by the collective
actions of managers—in particular, probabilities of possible outcomes are influenced
by the actions âo of all managers in the economy. The probability function of high
output shock π : R+ → [0, 1] is increasing and concave in âo. Note that output shocks
of different periods are independent but not necessarily identically distributed, because
when âo differs across periods, π(âo) differs, and hence, the probability distributions
across periods are non-identical.
Although we assume perfectly correlated shocks for firms, we allow different beliefs
for firms to mimic the impact of idiosyncratic shocks on firms’ decisions. Each firm
believes that the risk it faces is a convex combination of the risk managed by the
actions ao of its own managers and the risk managed by the actions âo of all managers
in the economy, i.e., by the state of the economy. In particular, each firm believes that
the probability of observing high output shock is ρπ(ao) + (1 − ρ)π(âo), where ρ
(∈ [0, 1]) is an exogenously given weight. Each firm can control its own managers’
actions ao by adjusting their wages wo, but cannot control all managers’ actions âo.
Thus, our model encompasses all possible beliefs for firms ranging from full control
(i.e.,ρ = 1) to no control (i.e.,ρ = 0) over the probability distribution of firms’ shocks.
In a rational-expectations competitive equilibrium, every manager of the same period
2 Old agents are both managers and shareholders of firms because otherwise managers would not necessarily
act in the best interest of shareholders, and this would create an agency problem and distort the results.
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Table 1 Timeline
Young of t fognuoYkcohSnrob t+1 born
Young of t− 1 become old realized Young of t become old
↓↓↓
t ↑ ↑ t+1
ay,ao,wy,wo cy,co, e, p,δ
determined determined
will take the same action ao = âo, which will in turn yield the following probability
for high output shock according to the beliefs of firms:
ρπ(ao) + (1 − ρ)π(âo)|ao=âo = π(âo).
Note that π(âo) is the actual probability of high output shock in equilibrium, so firms’
beliefs are consistent with the actual probability in equilibrium. Thus, each ρ yields a
rational-expectations competitive equilibrium as we show later in our analysis.
Timeline. As shown in Table 1, the sequence of events is as follows. First, new young
agents are born, and young agents of the previous period become old. Second, young
and old agents’ labor inputs ay and ao and wages wy and wo are determined, and
hence, labor markets clear. Third, output shock z is realized. Finally, depending on
the output shock, young and old agents’ consumptions cy and co, equity e, its price p,
and dividend δ are determined. Thus, the consumption good and equity markets clear.
Equilibrium. Before defining a rational-expectations competitive equilibrium, we
discuss each agent’s and firm’s optimization problems and market-clearing conditions.
Each agent solves the following problem:
max
csy ,c
s
o,e
s ,ao
u(csy) + π(̂ao)u(cHo ) + (1 − π(̂ao))u(cLo ) − φ(ao) (1)
s.t. csy ≤ aywy − pses (2)
cso ≤ aowo + (ps + δs)es, where s ∈ {H, L}. (3)
The objective of each agent given in (1) is to maximize his expected life-time utility
by choosing his consumption csy when young and cso when old, equity demand es , and
labor input ao when old. Note that the agent does not choose his labor input ay when
young, because he supplies his labor inelastically when he is young. Moreover, each
agent takes the probability of high shock (and of low shock), given that because this
probability is influenced by the actions âo of all (old) agents in the economy, and a
single agent has a negligible effect on this probability. Budget constraints (2) and (3)
ensure that each agent’s consumption does not exceed his income when he is young
and old, respectively. Similarly, each firm solves the following problem:
max
ay ,ao
[ρπ(ao) + (1 − ρ)π(âo)]zH + [1 − ρπ(ao) − (1 − ρ)π(âo)]zL
+ f (ay) − aywy − aowo. (4)
The objective of each firm given in (4) is to maximize its expected profit by choosing
its labor demand ay for young and ao for old agents.
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In addition to conditions stemming from agents’ and firms’ optimization problems,
a rational-expectations competitive equilibrium satisfies market-clearing conditions
for the consumption good, equity, and labor markets as well. The market-clearing
condition for the consumption good is csy +cso ≤ γ s , where s ∈ {H, L}. This condition
ensures that the total consumption of young and old agents does not exceed the total
output. Equity market clears when the demand for equity is equal to the supply of
equity. Because the supply of equity is fixed and normalized to one, the equity market-
clearing condition is es = 1, where s ∈ {H, L}. Moreover, dividend is equal to the
remaining output after wages are paid, so dividend δs = γ s − aywy − aowo, where
s ∈ {H, L}. Labor market clears when the demand for labor is equal to the supply of
labor. Because young agents supply their labor inelastically, the labor market-clearing
condition for young is ay = ay . We next define a rational-expectations competitive
equilibrium as follows.
Definition 1 A rational-expectations competitive equilibrium {̂csy, ĉso, p̂s,̂δs, ês, ŵy,
ŵo, ây, âo} is such that {̂csy, ĉso, ês, âo} solves (1)–(3) and {̂ay, âo} solves (4) given
ĉsy + ĉso = γ̂ s , ̂δs = γ̂ s − aywy − aowo, ês = 1, and ây = ay , where s ∈ {H, L}.
3 Analysis
3.1 Existence of equilibrium
As is common in the literature (e.g., Peled 1982; Aiyagari and Peled 1991), we restrict
attention to strongly stationary equilibrium, because such an equilibrium allows us
to derive analytical results, and it facilitates the interpretation of these results. Under
a strongly stationary rational-expectations competitive equilibrium, endogenous vari-
ables depend only on the current realization of output shocks, so they do not depend on
past realizations or lagged endogenous variables. We prove the existence of a strongly
stationary rational-expectations competitive equilibrium in Proposition 1. Note that
proofs of all propositions are presented in Appendix.
Proposition 1 For all ρ ∈ [0, 1], there exists a strongly stationary rational-
expectations competitive equilibrium allocation.
Given this existence result, we focus on strongly stationary equilibrium for the rest of
this paper.
3.2 Optimality of equilibrium
Up to now, we have discussed rational-expectations competitive equilibrium in which
each agent solves his utility maximization problem individually. We next shift our
focus to the efficiency of rational-expectations competitive equilibrium. To this end,
we will examine the planner’s problem, wherein the social planner takes actions on
behalf of all agents in the economy. In particular, the planner maximizes the weighted
average of young and old agents’ expected utilities by choosing consumption cy for
young and co for old agents and labor input ao for old agents. Note that the planner
does not choose labor input ay for young agents, because young agents supply their
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labor inelastically, i.e., ay = ay . The planner is subject to a resource constraint which
ensures that the total consumption of young and old agents does not exceed the total
output. Given a Pareto weight α ∈ [0, 1], a Pareto optimal allocation {cH,∗y , cL ,∗y , cH,∗o ,
c
L ,∗
o , a
∗
o } is a solution to the following planner’s problem:
max
csy ,c
s
o,ao
(1 − α)E[u(cy)] + αE[u(co) − φ(ao)] (5)
subject to csy + cso ≤ γ s, where s ∈ {H, L}. (6)
We prove the inefficiency of rational-expectations competitive equilibrium alloca-
tion in the proposition below.
Proposition 2 The rational-expectations competitive equilibrium allocation is not
Pareto optimal.3
As shown in Proposition 2, old agents’ collective risk management activities render
rational-expectations competitive equilibrium inefficient. To restore efficiency, we first
need to understand the source of inefficiency. The source of inefficiency is the exter-
nalities created by old agents’ collective risk management activities. On the firm side,
when ρ < 1, firms believe that the impact of their managers’ actions through the state
of the economy is external to them, so firms will not compensate their managers for
this impact.4 These uncompensated labor inputs of managers create an externality on
the firm side. On the agent side, collective actions of old agents determine the state
of the economy, and the state of the economy in turn affects consumption of young
(through equity prices) and old agents (through old agents’ wages, equity prices, and
dividends). However, while choosing his action, an individual old agent does not con-
sider that old agents’ collective actions affect their (and young agents’) consumption
through the state of the economy. Thus, the impact of old agents’ collective actions
through the state of the economy is external to an individual old agent, which results
in an externality on the agent side as well.
To attain socially optimal allocations, the externalities created by old agents’ col-
lective risk management activities must be internalized. To do so, the social planner
needs old agents to take socially optimal actions a∗o that consider both internal and
external effects of old agents’ actions. To implement socially optimal actions a∗o , old
agents must be paid socially optimal wages w∗o . To ensure that old agents are paid
3 Although this proposition holds under conditional optimality as well, we analyze ex ante optimality,
because it fits our model best. In our model, output shocks are driven by the collective actions of old agents,
and the resulting state probabilities affect both young and old agents, so we take unconditional expectation,
and use ex ante optimality. However, studies in which state probabilities are fixed and independent of agents’
actions take conditional expectation when agents are young, and hence, they use conditional optimality.
4 In the extreme case, when ρ = 0, firms believe that the risk they face is fully controlled by the state of
the economy and not affected by the actions of their own managers. Then, firms do not compensate their
managers for risk management activities, i.e., managers’ wages wo = 0. Because managers are not paid
for risk management activities, their labor inputs ao = 0. Note that in real life, firms will still compensate
their managers for the management of other activities, but we normalize such activities to zero to isolate
the impact of risk management activities. In the other extreme, when ρ = 1, firms believe that the risk they
face is fully controlled by the actions of their own managers and not affected by the state of the economy.
In this case, firms will fully compensate their managers, so there will be no externality on the firm side.
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1 2 3 4 5
(a) ρ= 0.5.
0 0.5 1
(b) zH/zL = 4.
Fig. 1 Old agents’ competitive and optimal wages as a function of the ratio of high shock to low shock
zH /zL and weight ρ (which represents firms’ beliefs about how much of the risk they face is controlled
by the actions of their own old agents), where young agent’s labor input ay = 10, exponent of old agent’s
disutility function g = 2, probability function exponent b = 2, and Pareto weight α = 0.5
socially optimal wages w∗o , the social planner must impose wage taxes tw, which are
equal to old agents’ competitive wages minus optimal wages, given that old agents
take socially optimal actions a∗o . Similarly, the social planner must impose equity tax
t s (for s ∈ {H, L}), so that the externalities in the equity market will be internalized.
Theorem 1 To attain a socially optimal rational-expectations competitive equilib-
rium, old agents must be paid socially optimal wages w∗o
= (1−α)π ′(a∗o )[u(c
H,∗
y )−u(cL ,∗y )]+απ ′(a∗o )[u(cH,∗o )−u(cL ,∗o )]
α[π(a∗o )u′(cH,∗o )+(1−π(a∗o ))u(cL ,∗o )]
. A Pareto optimal allocation
{cH,∗y , cL ,∗y , cH,∗o , cL ,∗o , a∗o } can be implemented if the social planner imposes wage
tax tw = ρπ ′(a∗o)(zH − zL) − w∗o and equity tax ts = E[u
′(c∗o)(p∗+δ∗)]−u′(cs,∗y )ps,∗
u′(cs,∗o )
for
s ∈ {H, L}.
3.3 Numerical analysis
We next numerically analyze old agents’ competitive and optimal wages.5 In partic-
ular, we examine how the ratio of high shock to low shock zH/zL and exogenous
weight ρ in firms’ profit functions affect old agents’ competitive and optimal wages.
For this numerical analysis, we use the following functional forms. Each agent’s pref-
erences are specified by a logarithmic utility function, so u(c) = log(c), where c is
consumption of a young or old agent. Each old agent’s disutility function is of the form
φ(ao) = ago , where g > 1. Each firm’s production function is of the form f (ay) = ay .
The probability function of high output shock is of the form π(ao) = 1− 1(1+ao)b . Note
that all functions satisfy the standard assumptions stated in Sect. 2, e.g., π(0) = 0,
limao→∞ π(ao) = 1.
Figure 1a illustrates that as the ratio of high shock to low shock zH/zL increases,
old agents’ both optimal and competitive wages increase, but optimal wages increase
5 The expressions for competitive and optimal wages are given in (24) and (33), respectively in Appendix.
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more. When high shock is equal to low shock (i.e., zH = zL ), firms do not face any
risk that old agents can manage, so old agents’ competitive wages wo = 0. As the
gap between high shock and low shock enlarges (i.e., zH/zL rises), however, marginal
contributions of old agents’ actions to their firms increase, and hence, old agents’
competitive wages increase. Moreover, as the gap between high shock and low shock
widens (i.e., zH/zL rises), marginal contributions of old agents’ actions to the state
of the economy increase as well. Because old agents’ optimal wages w∗o consider
both internal and external effects of old agents’ actions, old agents’ optimal wages
increase more than their competitive wages as the gap between high shock and low
shock enlarges (i.e., zH/zL rises).
Figure 1b depicts that as the exogenous weight ρ (which represents firms’ beliefs
about how much of the risk they face is controlled by the actions of their own old
agents) increases, old agents’ optimal wages do not change while competitive wages
increase. As ρ increases, firms believe that a higher portion of the risk they face is
controlled by the actions of their own old agents, and hence, firms pay higher wages
to their old agents (i.e., competitive wages rise). On the other hand, optimal wages w∗o
implement socially optimal actions a∗o for old agents, and these actions are determined
by the social planner, so they do not depend on firms’ beliefs. Thus, as ρ approaches
one, old agents’ competitive wages get closer to their optimal wages.
3.4 Information asymmetry
So far, we have analyzed the model in which managers’ actions and unit wages are
observable by the social planner. However, in the real world, managers’ actions ao
and unit wages wo may not be observable to the social planner, so we extend the
model by incorporating unobservable actions and unobservable unit wages for man-
agers.
As we have discussed after Proposition 2, a rational-expectations competitive equi-
librium is suboptimal because of the externalities in old agents’ wages and in equity
market. The former can be internalized by imposing wage taxes (on old agents) which
are equal to old agents’ competitive wages minus optimal wages. When old agents’
competitive wages wo (and labor inputs ao) are unobservable, however, the social plan-
ner cannot impose wage taxes on old agents, so cannot implement a Pareto optimal
allocation. However, the social planner can make Pareto improvements by implement-
ing a second-best allocation. Because the labor input ao cannot be observed by the
social planner, it will be determined in the market, where the demand for old agents’
labor [(24) in Appendix] is equal to the supply of old agents’ labor [(20) in Appendix].
Substituting the labor demand into the labor supply, we obtain the following condition:
[
π(ao)u
′(cHo ) + (1 − π(ao))u′(cLo )
]
ρπ ′(ao)(zH − zL) − φ′(ao) = 0. (7)
To ensure that the labor market condition (7) is satisfied, we add it as a constraint to the
planner’s problem (5), (6). Given a Pareto weight α ∈ [0, 1], a second-best allocation
{c˜Hy , c˜Ly , c˜Ho , c˜Lo , a˜o} is a solution to the following planner’s problem:
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Fig. 2 Ratio of social welfare
under second best to social
welfare under Pareto optimal
uSB/uPO as a function of the
ratio of high shock to low shock
zH /zL , where exponent of old
agent’s disutility function g = 2,
probability function exponent
b = 2, and Pareto weight
α = 0.5
1 2 3 4 5
1
max
csy ,c
s
o,ao
(1 − α)E[u(cy)] + α(E[u(co)] − φ(ao)) (8)
subject to csy + cso ≤ γ s (9)
[
π(ao)u
′(cHo ) + (1 − π(ao))u′(cLo )
]
ρπ ′(ao)(zH − zL) − φ′(ao) = 0.
(10)
When old agents’ unit wages wo and labor inputs ao are unobservable, the exter-
nalities in old agents’ wages cannot be internalized, so a Pareto optimal allocation
cannot be implemented. However, a second-best allocation can be implemented if the
externalities in the equity market are internalized by imposing an equity tax t s , where
s ∈ {H, L}.
Proposition 3 If the social planner imposes equity tax
ts = E[u
′(c˜o)( p˜ + δ˜)] − u′(c˜sy) p˜s
u′(c˜so)
for s ∈ {H, L},
a second-best allocation {c˜Hy , c˜Ly , c˜Ho , c˜Lo , a˜o} can be implemented.
We next numerically analyze social welfare under a second-best allocation com-
pared to social welfare under a Pareto optimal allocation. Figure 2 demonstrates that
as the ratio of high shock to low shock zH/zL increases, social welfare under a second-
best allocation diverges from social welfare under a Pareto optimal allocation. When
high shock is equal to low shock (i.e., zH = zL ), firms do not face any risk that old
agents can manage, and hence old agents’ competitive wages wo = 0 (see Fig. 1a).
Then, failing to observe wo (and labor input ao) is not costly, so social welfare under
second best reaches social welfare under Pareto optimal. As the gap between high
shock and low shock widens (i.e., zH/zL rises), however, old agents’ wages wo are
positive (see Fig. 1a), so failing to observe wo (and ao) becomes costly, and hence,
social welfare under second best diverges from social welfare under Pareto optimal.
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4 Conclusion
We have studied how endogenous output shocks driven by collective actions of
managers impact social welfare. We prove the inefficiency of rational-expectations
competitive equilibrium in the presence of such endogenous shocks. The source of
inefficiency is the externalities in managers’ wages and in equity market. We establish
that to attain a socially optimal allocation, these externalities must be internalized by
imposing wage taxes (or subsidies) on managers and equity taxes. Our results provide
an alternative explanation as to why managers are compensated and taxed differently
than other workers. It may be optimal to give managers wage tax subsidies because
of the (positive) externalities their collective actions create. We then extend the model
by incorporating unobservable actions for managers and show that a second-best allo-
cation can be implemented by imposing equity taxes.
There are several avenues for future research. First, although we consider identical
agents and identical firms in this paper, it would be an interesting extension to incor-
porate heterogeneity. For example, the economy is populated with a few big firms,
whose managers’ actions affect the state of the economy and with many small firms,
whose managers’ actions do not affect the state of the economy. In this case, one can
examine how the actions of big firms’ managers affect managers and low-skilled work-
ers at small firms, and how such externalities can be internalized. Second, our model
suggests imposing wage taxes (or subsidies) on managers to attain socially optimal
allocations. On the other hand, it is well known that the drastic increase in managerial
compensation over a couple of decades is an important determinant of the income
distribution inequality. In this case, an interesting avenue would be to investigate how
wage taxes (or subsidies) on managers influence the income distribution inequality.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 We will prove the existence of a strongly stationary rational-
expectations competitive equilibrium. Given twice continuously differentiable utility
function u, the resulting consumption demands cy[p, ay] and co[pH , pL , δH , δL ],
the optimal labor input ao[pH , pL , δH , δL ] when old, and the demand for equity
e[pH , pL , δH , δL ] are continuous functions of prices and dividends (and of shock
parameters), so utility function (1) is continuous. The constraint set (2), (3) is convex
and compact. Thus, there exists a solution to agent’s utility maximization problem
(1)–(3) by Weierstrass Theorem. Similarly, profit function (4) is continuous and its
domain is compact, so there exists a solution to firm’s profit maximization problem
(4) by Weierstrass Theorem.
The utility function u is concave in consumptions cHy , cLy , cHo , and cLo , and the
disutility functionφ is convex in labor input ao. Every term in utility function U given in
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(1) appears in additive form, so Hessian of U is a diagonal matrix. The diagonal entries
of Hessian are ∂2U
∂(cHy )
2 = u′′(cHy ) < 0, ∂
2U
∂(cLy )
2 = u′′(cLy ) < 0, ∂
2U
∂(cHo )
2 = π(̂ao)u′′(cHo ) <
0, and ∂2U
∂(cLo )
2 = (1−π(̂ao))u′′(cLo ) < 0 and ∂
2U
∂a2o
= −φ′′(ao) < 0. Thus, Hessian of U
is negative definite, and hence, U is concave. Since agent’s optimization problem (1)–
(3) is a concave programming, its first-order conditions are sufficient for optimality and
yield unique solution. Similarly, the production function f is concave in young agent’s
labor input ay and the probability function π is concave in old agent’s labor input ao.
Every term in profit function P given in (4) appears in additive form, so Hessian of
P is a diagonal matrix. The diagonal entries of Hessian are ∂2 P
∂a2y
= f ′′(ay) < 0 and
∂2 P
∂a2o
= ρπ ′′(ao)(zH − zL) < 0. Note that because there is a continuum of agents,
a single old (respectively, young) agent’s action ao (respectively, ay) does not affect
his unit wage wo (respectively, wy). Hence, Hessian of P is negative definite, so P
is concave. Because firm’s optimization problem (4) is a concave programming, its
first-order conditions are sufficient for optimality and yield unique solution.
Via the solutions to the firm’s problem and the definition of dividends, we can
substitute into the agent’s demand functions and eliminate the need to consider the
supply side of the economy. Let ζ sy be the excess demand of the young agent born in
state s ∈ {H, L} and ζ so be the excess demand of the old agent when the current state
is s ∈ {H, L}, such that
ζ sy = csy[ps] − aywy (11)
ζ so = cso[pH , pL ] − aowo. (12)
Note that equity es = 1 in equilibrium, and the demand of the old agent cannot depend
on the state he is born in. We then define aggregate excess demand:
ζ s = ζ sy + ζ so , where s ∈ {H, L}. (13)
Moreover, equilibrium requires that ζ s − δs = 0.
To prove the existence of an equilibrium, we first show that prices must be bounded
above zero and below infinity. Using sequential budget constraints (11) and (12), we
get
ζ sy = −pses (14)
ζ so = (ps + δs)es . (15)
Substituting equity es in (15) into (14), we obtain the agent’s intertemporal budget
constraint
ζ sy + qss
′
ζ s
′
o = 0 (16)
the present-value price of consumption
qss
′ = p
s
ps′ + δs′ , where s ∈ {H, L} and s
′ ∈ {H, L}. (17)
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If ps → 0 (regardless of how ps′ changes), we have qss′ → 0 from (17), and the
old agent can afford unlimited consumption, and hence we have ζ so → ∞ from (16).
As ps → 0, we have ζ sy → 0 from (14), so we have ζ s → ∞ from (13). Next, if
ps → ∞ while ps′ is bounded, we have qss′ → ∞ from (17), so ζ so → 0 from
(16). As ps → ∞, we have from (14) either ζ sy → −∞ if we allow unlimited short-
sales of consumption, or, more realistically, ζ sy < 0 if we restrict consumption to be
non-negative. In either case, we have ζ s < 0 from (13). Finally, if both ps → ∞
and ps′ → ∞ simultaneously, we have qss′ → 1 from (17), which then implies that
ζ s → 0 from (13) and (16).
We restrict prices ps to lie in a square B = [pmin, pmax] × [pmin, pmax] with the
minimum and maximum prices chosen, so that any equilibrium price must lie in the
box, if it exists. We then define a mapping ν : B → R2, such that
ν(pH , pL) =
[
pH
pL
]
+
[
ζ H − δH
ζ L − δL
]
= τ + Z
The mapping ν naturally defines a vector field on B via Z = ν(pH , pL) − τ . We
now apply the Poincare–Hopf Theorem to this vector field. Note that from our limit
calculations above, if any price gets small, the Z vector will be positive; if any price
gets large, the Z vector will become negative; and if both prices become large (but
finite) simultaneously, Z will also become negative. Hence, the vector field points
into B on ∂ B, so the Poincare–Hopf Theorem applies, and the number of zeros mod
2 of the vector field in B must be equal to the Euler characteristic of B. Since B is
homeomorphic to a two-simplex, its Euler characteristic is 1. Thus, there must be at
least one zero for Z in the interior of B, and this is clearly an equilibrium for the model.
Note that in the entire proof, endogenous variables do not depend on past realizations
of output shocks or on lagged variables. Therefore, there exists a strongly stationary
rational-expectations competitive equilibrium. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 2 We will prove that a rational-expectations competitive equi-
librium is not Pareto optimal. To do so, we will first derive a rational-expectations
competitive equilibrium equations and Pareto optimality equations.
A rational-expectations competitive equilibrium satisfies market-clearing con-
ditions and first-order conditions stemming from agents’ and firms’ optimization
problems. After substituting the market-clearing conditions ês = 1 and ây = ay ,
first-order conditions of agents’ optimization problem (1)–(3) are
∂U
∂eH
= −u′(̂cHy ) p̂H + π(̂ao)u′(̂cHo )( p̂H +̂δH )
+ (1 − π(̂ao))u′(̂cLo )( p̂L +̂δL) = 0 (18)
∂U
∂eL
= −u′(̂cLy ) p̂L + π(̂ao)u′(̂cHo )( p̂H +̂δH )
+ (1 − π(̂ao))u′(̂cLo )( p̂L +̂δL) = 0 (19)
∂U
∂ao
= [π(̂ao)u′(̂cHo ) + (1 − π(̂ao))u′(̂cLo )
]
ŵo − φ′(̂ao) = 0 (20)
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ĉsy = ayŵy − p̂s, where s ∈ {H, L} (21)
ĉs
′
o = âoŵo + p̂s
′ +̂δs′ , where s′ ∈ {H, L}. (22)
After substituting ây = ay , first-order conditions of firms’ optimization problem (4)
are
∂ P
∂ay
= f ′(ay) − ŵy = 0 (23)
∂ P
∂ao
= ρπ ′(̂ao)(zH − zL) − ŵo = 0. (24)
The remaining market-clearing conditions are
̂δs = γ̂ s − ayŵy − âoŵo (25)
ĉsy + ĉso = γ̂ s, where s ∈ {H, L}. (26)
Because (21), (22), and (25) together imply (26), rational-expectations competitive
equilibrium equations are (18)–(25). We then derive the equations that a Pareto optimal
allocation satisfies. Letting λs ≥ 0 be the Lagrange multiplier of (6), the first-order
conditions of the planner’s problem (5), (6) are
(1 − α)π(a∗o)u′(cH,∗y ) − λH = 0 (27)
(1 − α)(1 − π(a∗o))u′(cL ,∗y ) − λL = 0 (28)
απ(a∗o)u′(cH,∗o ) − λH = 0 (29)
α(1 − π(a∗o))u′(cL ,∗o ) − λL = 0 (30)
(1 − α)π ′(a∗o)
[
u(cH,∗y ) − u(cL ,∗y )
] + α[π ′(a∗o)
[
u(cH,∗o ) − u(cL ,∗o )
] − φ′(a∗o)
] = 0
(31)
cs,∗y + cs,∗o = γ s,∗, where s ∈ {H, L}. (32)
Suppose to the contrary that rational-expectations competitive equilibrium allo-
cation is Pareto optimal. We let {̂csy, ĉso, p̂s,̂δs, ês, ŵy, ŵo, ây, âo} be a rational-
expectations competitive equilibrium. Then, {̂csy, ĉso, p̂s,̂δs, ês, ŵy, ŵo, ây, âo} sat-
isfies the rational-expectations competitive equilibrium equations (18)–(25) by defini-
tion, and there is a Pareto weight α ∈ [0, 1], such that {̂csy, ĉso, p̂s,̂δs, ês, ŵy, ŵo, ây,
âo} satisfies Pareto optimality equations (27)–(32). Because (21), (22), and (25)
together imply (32), it suffices to show that (27)–(31) are satisfied. Given the market-
clearing conditions ês = 1 and ây = ay , we have a system of 16 equations: (18)–(25)
and (27)–(31) and 14 variables: csy , cso, ps , δs , λs , wy , wo, ao, α, where s ∈ {H, L}. If
these equations were dependent, we could have a Pareto optimal rational-expectations
competitive equilibrium. However, a routine application of the multi-jet transversal-
ity theorem will establish that generically, there are no solutions to over-determined
system of equations. An even easier way to show this is outlined below.
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We want to define a smooth perturbation of the young agent’s utility function
on a small neighborhood of his consumption cHy in the high state. We define the
neighborhood as the interval [cHy − b, cHy + b]. Furthermore, within this interval, we
define a sub-interval [cHy − a, cHy + a] , where b > a > 0. For the remainder of this
calculation, we will re-center the coordinates so that cHy = 0. We now use a bump
function η(x) as defined on page 42 in Hirsch (1976) to construct a perturbation on
the neighborhood of the utility function as
u˜(x) = [1 − η(x)]u(x) + η(x)[u(x) + ε]
= u(x) + η(x)ε.
We need the perturbed function to be strictly concave, such that (in translated coordi-
nates) u˜′(x) = u′(x). The condition on the derivative is guaranteed by that fact that
η(x) = 1 for x ∈ [−a, a]. To guarantee the concavity condition, we need to consider
the second derivative of η. To define the bump function η formally, we first define a
function g (as in Hirsch 1976 on page 42), on the interval a ≤ x ≤ b, such that
g(x) = 1
B
∫ b
x
e
− (b−a)
(y−a)(b−y) dy, where B =
∫ b
a
e
− (b−a)
(y−a)(b−y) dy.
We now define the complete bump function:
η(x) =
⎧
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎩
0 if x ≤ −b
g(−x) if − b ≤ x ≤ −a
1 if − a ≤ x ≤ a
g(x) if a ≤ x ≤ b
0 if x ≥ b
⎫
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎬
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎭
.
Given the symmetry in the definition of the bump function, we can restrict attention
to the case a ≤ x ≤ b for derivative calculations. In this case, we have g′(x) =
− 1B e−
(b−a)
(x−a)(b−x) , so that we get
g′′(x) = 1
B
e
− (b−a)
(x−a)(b−x) · (b − a)
(x − a)(b − x) ·
(b − a)[2x − (a + b)]
[(x − a)(b − x)]2 .
Since the first two terms are non-negative, the sign of g′′ depends on the third term, and
g′′(x) < 0 when a < x < a+b2 , and g
′′(x) > 0 for a+b2 < x < b. Since g
′′(x) = 0
for 0 ≤ x ≤ a and for x ≥ b, g′′ is bounded on the interval [0, b]. By symmetry, the
same is true on the interval [−b, 0], so g′′ is bounded. Hence, by taking ε sufficiently
small, we can guarantee that u˜(x) is strictly concave. Therefore, this perturbation
will keep the rational-expectations competitive equilibrium equations (18)–(25) the
same, but change Pareto optimality equations (27)–(32). Hence, a rational-expectations
competitive equilibrium is not Pareto optimal. unionsq
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Proof of Theorem 1 We will first show that to attain a Pareto optimal rational-
expectations competitive equilibrium, old agents must be paid optimal wages w∗o =
(1−α)π ′(a∗o )[u(cH,∗y )−u(cL ,∗y )]+απ ′(a∗o )[u(cH,∗o )−u(cL ,∗o )]
α[π(a∗o )u′(cH,∗o )+(1−π(a∗o ))u(cL ,∗o )]
. We will then prove that a Pareto opti-
mal allocation can be implemented by imposing wage tax tw = ρπ ′(a∗o)(zH − zL)−
φ′(a∗o )
E[u′(c∗o)] and equity tax t
s = E[u′(c∗o)(p∗+δ∗)]−u′(c
s,∗
y )ps,∗
u′(cs,∗o )
for s ∈ {H, L}.
As shown in Proposition 2, a rational-expectations competitive equilibrium is not
Pareto optimal, because it fails to satisfy all rational-expectations competitive equi-
librium (18)–(25) and Pareto optimality equations (27)–(32) simultaneously. Both
rational-expectations competitive equilibrium and Pareto optimality equations involve
first-order conditions with respect to ao, and unless these two equations (i.e., (20) and
(31)) are combined, a rational-expectations competitive equilibrium allocation cannot
satisfy both sets of equations. Substituting (20) into (31), we obtain the old agent’s
optimal wage
w∗o =
(1 − α)π ′(a∗o)[u(cH,∗y ) − u(cL ,∗y )] + απ ′(a∗o)[u(cH,∗o ) − u(cL ,∗o )]
α[π(a∗o)u′(cH,∗o ) + (1 − π(a∗o))u(cL ,∗o )]
. (33)
We will derive the updated rational-expectations competitive equilibrium equations
after imposing wage tax tw and equity tax t s . After imposing wage tax tw, the old
agent’s wage equation (24) changes as follows:
wo = ρπ ′(ao)(zH − zL) − tw. (34)
After imposing equity tax t s , the old agent’s budget constraint becomes
cso = aowo + (ps − t s + δs)es + t s . (35)
Substituting the equity market-clearing condition es = 1, (35) collapses to the old
agent’s original budget constraint (22). After imposing equity tax t s , the first-order
conditions with respect to equity (18) and (19) change as follows
π(ao)[u′(cHo )(pH − t H + δH )] + (1 − π(ao))[u′(cLo )(pL − t L + δL)]
= u′(cHy )pH (36)
π(ao)[u′(cHo )(pH − t H + δH )] + (1 − π(ao))[u′(cLo )(pL − t L + δL)]
= u′(cLy )pL . (37)
Thus, the updated rational-expectations competitive equilibrium equations are (20)–
(23), (25), (34), (36), and (37).
Let {cH,∗y , cL ,∗y , cH,∗o , cL ,∗o , a∗o } be a Pareto optimal allocation, then it satisfies the
Pareto optimality equations (27)–(32) by definition. We will prove, by construction,
that {cH,∗y , cL ,∗y , cH,∗o , cL ,∗o , a∗o } satisfies the updated rational-expectations competitive
equilibrium equations (20)–(23), (25), (34), (36), and (37). Substituting cH,∗o , cL ,∗o , and
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a∗o into (20) gives the old agent’s optimal wage w∗o = φ
′(a∗o )
E[u′(c∗o)] . Substituting a
∗
y = ay
into (23) yields the young agent’s optimal wage w∗y = f ′(ay). Plugging w∗y, w∗o , and
a∗o into (25), we get dividend δs,∗ = γ s,∗−ayw∗y −a∗ow∗o , where s ∈ {H, L}. Plugging
c
s,∗
y and w∗y into (21), we obtain prices ps,∗ = ayw∗y −cs,∗y , where s ∈ {H, L}. Because
we now know the expressions for all variables (i.e., cL ,∗y , cH,∗o , cL ,∗o , pH,∗, pL ,∗, δH,∗,
δL ,∗, w∗y , w∗o , a∗o ), we next verify the remaining equations. Plugging cs,∗o , a∗o , w∗o , ps,∗,
and δs,∗ verifies (22) as follows:
cs,∗o = a∗ow∗o + ps,∗ + δs,∗ = −cs,∗y + γ s = cs,∗o , where s ∈ {H, L}.
Substituting w∗o , a∗o , and tw into (34), we obtain
w∗o = ρπ ′(a∗o)(zH − zL) − tw =
φ′(a∗o)
E[u′(c∗o)]
.
Plugging cs,∗o , cs,∗y , a∗o , ps,∗, δs,∗, and t s into (36), we get
u′(cH,∗y )pH,∗ = π(a∗o)[u′(cH,∗o )(pH,∗ − t H + δH,∗)]
+ (1 − π(a∗o))[u′(cL ,∗o )(pL ,∗ − t L + δL ,∗)]
= π(a∗o)
[
u′(cH,∗o )
(
pH,∗ − E[u
′(c∗o)(p∗ + δ∗)] − u′(cH,∗y )pH,∗
u′(cH,∗o )
+ δH,∗
)]
+ (1−π(a∗o ))
[
u′(cL ,∗o )
(
pL ,∗ − E[u
′(c∗o)(p∗+δ∗)] − u′(cL ,∗y )pL ,∗
u′(cL ,∗o )
+ δL ,∗
)]
= E[u′(c∗o)(p∗ + δ∗)] + π(a∗o)u′(cH,∗y )pH,∗
+(1 − π(a∗o))u′(cL ,∗y )pL ,∗ − E[u′(c∗o)(p∗ + δ∗)]
= π(a∗o)u′(cH,∗y )pH,∗ + (1 − π(a∗o))u′(cL ,∗y )pL ,∗. (38)
Moreover, (36) and (37) imply that u′(cH,∗y )pH,∗ = u′(cL ,∗y )pL ,∗, and plugging this
into (38) gives
u′(cH,∗y )pH,∗ = π(a∗o)u′(cH,∗y )pH,∗ + (1 − π(a∗o))u′(cL ,∗y )pL ,∗ = u′(cH,∗y )pH,∗.
Similarly, substituting cs,∗o , cs,∗y , a∗o , ps,∗, δs,∗, t s , and u′(c
H,∗
y )pH,∗ = u′(cL ,∗y )pL ,∗
into (37) yields
u′(cL ,∗y )pL ,∗ = π(a∗o)u′(cH,∗y )pH,∗ + (1 − π(a∗o))u′(cL ,∗y )pL ,∗ = u′(cL ,∗y )pL ,∗. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 3 We will show that a second-best allocation can be implemented
if the social planner imposes equity tax t s = E[u′(c˜o)( p˜+δ˜)]−u′(c˜sy) p˜s
u′(c˜so)
, where s ∈ {H, L}.
123
A theory of managerial compensation and taxation. . .
We first derive the equations that a second-best allocation satisfies. Letting μ ≥ 0
be the Lagrange multiplier of (10), the first-order conditions of (8)–(10) are
π(ao)[(1 − α)u′(cHy ) − αu′(γ H − cHy ) − μu′′(γ H − cHy )ρπ ′(ao)(zH − zL)] = 0
(39)
(1 − π(ao))[(1 − α)u′(cLy ) − αu′(γ L − cLy ) − μu′′(γ L − cLy )ρπ ′(ao)(zH − zL)]
= 0 (40)
(1 − α)π ′(ao)[u(cHy ) − u(cLy )] + απ ′(ao)[u(γ H − cHy ) − u(γ L − cLy )]
− αφ′(ao) − μφ′′(ao) (41)
+ μπ ′(ao)[u′(γ H − cHy ) − u′(γ L − cLy )]ρπ ′(ao)(zH − zL)
+ μE[u′(γ − cy)]ρπ ′′(ao)(zH − zL) = 0 (42)
[π(ao)u′(cHo ) + (1 − π(ao))u′(cLo )]ρπ ′(ao)(zH − zL) − φ′(ao) = 0 (43)
csy + cso = γ s, where s ∈ {H, L}. (44)
After equity tax t s is imposed, first-order conditions with respect to equity (18) and (19)
change to (36) and (37), so the updated rational-expectations competitive equilibrium
equations are (20)–(25), (36), and (37).
Let {c˜Hy , c˜Ly , c˜Ho , c˜Lo , a˜o} be a second-best allocation, then it satisfies the second-best
equations (39)–(44) by definition. We will prove, by construction, that {c˜Hy , c˜Ly , c˜Ho , c˜Lo ,
a˜o} satisfies the updated rational-expectations competitive equilibrium equations
(20)–(25), (36), and (37). We obtain (43) by substituting (24) into (20), so
{c˜Hy , c˜Ly , c˜Ho , c˜Lo , a˜o} satisfies (20) and (24), and hence, the old agent’s wage w˜o =
ρπ ′(a˜o)(zH − zL). Substituting a˜y = ay into (23) yields the young agent’s wage
w˜y = f ′(ay). Plugging a˜o, w˜y , and w˜o into (25) gives dividend δ˜s = γ˜ s −
ayw˜y − a˜ow˜o for s ∈ {H, L}. Substituting c˜sy and w˜y into (21), we get prices
p˜s = ayw˜y − c˜sy for s ∈ {H, L}. Since we know the expressions for all variables (i.e.,
˜cHy , c˜Ly , c˜Ho , c˜Lo , p˜H , p˜L , δ˜H , δ˜L , w˜y, w˜o, a˜o), we next verify the remaining equations.
Substituting c˜so, a˜o, w˜o, p˜s , and δ˜s verifies (22) as follows:
c˜so = a˜ow˜o + p˜s + δ˜s = −c˜sy + γ s = c˜so for s ∈ {H, L}.
Plugging c˜sy , c˜so, a˜o, p˜s , δ˜s , and t s into (36), we obtain
u′(c˜Hy ) p˜H = π(a˜o)[u′(c˜Ho )( p˜H − t H + δ˜H )]
+ (1 − π(a˜o))[u′(c˜Lo )( p˜L − t L + δ˜L)]
= π(a˜o)
[
u′(c˜Ho )
(
p˜H − E[u
′(c˜o)( p˜ + δ˜)] − u′(c˜Hy ) p˜H
u′(c˜Ho )
+ δ˜H
)]
+ (1 − π(a˜o))
[
u′(c˜Lo )
(
p˜L − E[u
′(c˜o)( p˜ + δ˜)] − u′(c˜Ly ) p˜L
u′(c˜Lo )
+ δ˜L
)]
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= E[u′(c˜o)( p˜ + δ˜)] + π(a˜o)u′(c˜Hy ) p˜H
+ (1 − π(a˜o))u′(c˜Ly ) p˜L − E[u′(c˜o)( p˜ + δ˜)]
= π(a˜o)u′(c˜Hy ) p˜H + (1 − π(a˜o))u′(c˜Ly ) p˜L . (45)
Moreover, (36) and (37) imply that u′(c˜Hy ) p˜H = u′(c˜Ly ) p˜L , and plugging this into
(45) gives
u′(c˜Hy ) p˜H = π(a˜o)u′(c˜Hy ) p˜H + (1 − π(a˜o))u′(c˜Ly ) p˜L = u′(c˜Hy ) p˜H .
Similarly, substituting c˜sy , c˜so, a˜o, p˜s , δ˜s , t s , and u′(c˜Hy ) p˜H = u′(c˜Ly ) p˜L into (37) yields
u′(c˜Ly ) p˜L = π(a˜o)u′(c˜Hy ) p˜H + (1 − π(a˜o))u′(c˜Ly ) p˜L = u′(c˜Ly ) p˜L . unionsq
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